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Can Common Business Practices
Ever Be Anticompetitive? Redefining
Monopolization
Konstantinos Stylianou*
For most of its modern history, antitrust law distinguished between nor-
mal competition and monopolization by looking for merit, legitimate
business justifications, or efficiencies in the challenged business conduct.
These proxies were seen as appropriate because they served antitrust
law’s welfare objectives well. However, the universal adoption of these
proxies has overshadowed significant shortcomings, chief among them
being that firms do not think in terms of legitimate business justifications
or efficiencies, but rather in terms of long-term sustainability and appro-
priation of value. As a result, antitrust law becomes detached from the
very subjects it purports to regulate. Against the backdrop of the recent
resurgence of enforcement activity, particularly involving tech giants, this
article attempts a conceptualization of monopolization that does not
revolve around merit in any form or function. Instead it introduces the
proxy of commonness of business practices to determine their legality.
This helps highlight the importance of considering “how things are
done” in the relevant market, and helps reground antitrust law in busi-
ness realities, which can enhance the heuristic mechanism of dis-
tinguishing between normal and anticompetitive practices. To prove this
point the article develops an error test framework, through which it
compares current tests with the proposed test in terms of their error
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footprint and concludes that the integration of the commonness parame-
ter delivers better results. Ultimately, the inquiry undertaken herein is
not only about constructing a conception of normal competition different
from the only standard we currently have, that is, variants of merit, but
also about shifting the conversation from how to fine-tune existing stan-
dards to how to capture a more complete conception of competition.
INTRODUCTION
Antitrust law has always struggled to distinguish between normal and
unilateral anticompetitive conduct, known as monopolization in the
United States and abuse of dominance in the European Union. Done
properly, the task would separate practices that tend to increase eco-
nomic welfare and are labeled normal competition from those that tend
to reduce it and are referred to as anticompetitive, monopolistic, or abu-
sive practices.1 The task is difficult because the means of illicit conduct
and the means of legitimate competition are myriad, and virtually every
anticompetitive act has a measure of procompetitive benefits. This
exposes the inquiry to heightened subjectivity and potential open-ended
interpretation.2
There is certainly no shortage of tests to distinguish between normal
and monopolistic conduct. Many of them are unhelpful because they are
circular. To define, for example, monopolization or abuse of dominance
as conduct that “unfairly tends to destroy competition,”3 “[is] directed at
smothering competition,”4 “substantially fetter[s] competition,”5 or as
“recourse to methods different from those which condition normal com-
petition”6 adds little to the inquiry because these formulations contain
1LAWRENCE SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 10–11 (2016);
GIORGIO MONTI, EC COMPETITION LAW 22 (2007).
2Cf. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
3Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
4Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979).
5Case 6/72, Euroemballage Corp. v. Comm’n, 1973 E.C.R. 215, 245 ¶ 26.
6Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 465, 541 ¶ 91.
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terms similar to those they are supposed to prove and are therefore
vacuous.7
However, the majority of tests are not vacuous, and an interesting—if
overlooked—pattern emerges when one looks at them collectively. Virtu-
ally every other non-vacuous test antitrust courts and enforcers have
devised relies on a showing of merit, legitimate business justifications, or
efficiencies to determine that a challenged practice is normal competition
as opposed to monopolization or abuse of dominance. This kind of sanc-
tioned competition manifests itself through various terms, including
“business acumen,”8 “valid business reasons,”9 “superior product,”10
“traders’ performance,”11 “merit,”12 and “procompetitive justification
[and] efficiency,”13 and is also prevalent within scholarly discourse.14 In
other words, vacuous tests aside, we have no other understanding of
legitimate competition outside of what can collectively be called competi-
tion on the merits.
There is no doubt that competition on the merits, in any of its above
variants, is a good standard, as it contributes to increased economic effi-
ciency and welfare—both signs of healthy markets.15 Its universal accep-
tance may even imply that courts, enforcers, and scholars consider it the
best available standard. But we will never know how well competition on
the merits fares against other possible conceptions of legitimate competi-
tion, unless we devise a standard that does not revolve around merit in
any form or function. This article is an exploration in that direction. It
7Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253, 261–68 (2003).
8United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
9Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).
10Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 (1985).
11Case C-322/81, Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3467, 3514 ¶ 70.
12Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar PLC v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-2975, 3021 ¶ 111 (citing Case
C-62/86, AKZO v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, at ¶ 69).
13United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
14See infra notes 58–67 and accompanying text.
15KIP W. VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 79–99 (2005); Joseph Far-
rell & Michael L Katz, The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust, 2 COMP. POL’Y INT’L
3 (2006).
2020 / Redefining Monopolization 171
moves away from conceptions of merit to distinguish normal and
monopolistic business, and instead, it introduces the proxy of common-
ness of business practices to determine their legality under antitrust law.
The commonness test proposition is controversial and not without its
problems; however, it is also a rare (or even the only) alternative to com-
petition on the merits, and it can help courts and authorities capture a
more complete understanding of competition instead of fine-tuning exis-
ting concepts.
The impetus behind the departure from competition on the merits is
the observation that the kind of competition that revolves around busi-
ness justifications and efficiencies is often misaligned with business logic.
This, in turn disconnects antitrust analysis from the very entities it pur-
ports to regulate. Current tests overlook the fact that firms do not think
in terms of legitimate justifications and efficiencies, nor do they prioritize
consumer welfare.16 Instead, firms think in terms of long-term sustain-
ability and appropriation of value, and consumers are just one of the
constituencies that the modern theory of the firm identifies as relevant.17
Antitrust matured within a neoclassical economic model and successfully
incorporated industrial economics, the field that studies the structure of
the market. Along the way, antitrust forgot to pay heed to strategic man-
agement, the field that equally if not more so shapes the conduct and
operation of businesses.18 This creates a problem since courts and
authorities may resist benign activities.19 The incorporation of common-
ness into the heuristic of distinguishing between normal and monopolis-
tic or abusive conduct can help reground antitrust law and practice in
modern business practices and help antitrust achieve its welfare
objectives.
16See infra Part II.A.
17Id.
18See 12 STRAT. MGMT J. 1-155 (1991) (devoting an entire special issue of this journal to the
differences between these models); see also infra Part II.A.
19On that point, parts of various cases are discussed infra Part II.A, including United States
v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Case 77/77, BP v. Comm’n, 1978
E.C.R. 1514; Case 27/76, United Brands Co. v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 209; Commission
Decision 2017 O.J. (C 4444) (involving Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping)) [herein-
after Google Search], https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_
14996_3.pdf; Commission Decision 2019 O.J. (C 402) 19–22 (involving Case AT.40099 Goo-
gle Android [hereinafter Google Android].
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Specifically, the commonness test suggests that a business practice is
normal competition—and therefore not monopolistic—if it is common in
the market in which it occurs and not designed to harm competition (the
operative word here being designed). This test dispenses with the need to
prove legitimate business justifications or efficiencies. What commonness
indicates is that the practice is well adapted to the needs and features of
the relevant market since multiple firms rationally and independently20
think that the practice ensures their survival. As basic as it sounds to con-
sider how things are done in the market, case law to this effect has been
scarce, and a gap in legal analysis has yet to be filled.
This proposed approach is admittedly controversial on several
grounds. Most obviously, it is tempting to reject the test on the basis that
it condones potentially anticompetitive practices simply because they are
common. Moreover, the proposed test seems to fall victim to the is–ought
fallacy, that is, simply because a state of affairs exists does not mean it
should.21 Also, whatever the value of commonness, it is not obvious that
it should be allowed to take precedence over merit. These and other crit-
icisms are recognized and will be addressed. The commonness test is not
infallible, but neither are the tests that rely on business justifications and
efficiencies; ultimately the question is which one yields better relative
results. To that end, the article develops an error cost framework to jux-
tapose the error cost of the commonness test in relation to competition
on the merits tests. While error cost frameworks are not a novelty in anti-
trust law analysis, they have remained underused and underdevel-
oped.22 To enhance rigor, an effort is made here to collect and
systematize the factors that should be considered to calculate the error
cost, including not only the frequency of errors, but also their social
impact, persistence, and potential mitigating mechanisms.
Further, while the proposed test gives precedence to the commonness
proxy over variants of merit, it integrates well with existing tests, because
20Since the concept of normal competition is used in situations involving monopolization/
unilateral practices, the scope of the test under that framework is limited.
21See John R. Searle, How to Derive “Ought” from “Is,” 73 PHIL. REV. 43, 43–58 (1964).
22See David S. Evans & A. Jorge Padilla, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Prac-
tices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (2005); Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Con-
duct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
311 (2006). Additional frameworks are discussed infra Part III.A.
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if a practice fails either of the two conditions of the commonness test,
examiners may revert to an existing merit test of their choice. Moreover,
since commonness is a matter of degree, there is no cut-off point after
which the commonness test takes over. Rather, the more common a prac-
tice, the less important business justifications and efficiencies become and
vice versa. This sliding scale ensures that the commonness parameter
takes priority only when its findings are robust.
This article aims to construct a new conception of normal competition
that differs from the current merit standard, and in doing so it highlights
the importance of factoring in business models and the modus operandi of
an industry. It is important to recognize that like other tests, the proposed
test does not have an absolute claim to the truth and it accepts that differ-
ent antitrust law offenses may require the application of different tests.23
The article proceeds as follows. Part I documents the dominance of
legitimate business justifications and efficiencies in modern antitrust
analysis. This will highlight the degree of antitrust law’s exposure to any
problems associated with these proxies. Part II offers a systematic discus-
sion regarding why exclusive reliance on business justifications and effi-
ciencies is problematic and the need for novel proxies. Part III fills that
gap by introducing the commonness test as a possible solution to the
identified problem. This part also introduces an error framework to
show that incorporating commonness potentially enhances the ability to
distinguish between normal and monopolistic conduct.
I. THE PRECARIOUS UNIVERSALITY OF BUSINESS
JUSTIFICATIONS AND EFFICIENCIES AS NORMAL
COMPETITION
For all its significance, what the law understands as normal competition
has been and remains elusive. The concept is central to determine the
legality or illegality of unilateral competitive conduct of firms with mar-
ket power.24 This is because market power by itself is not an offense—
23See, e.g., Mark S. Popofsky, Defining Exclusionary Conduct: Section 2, The Rule of Reason, and
the Unifying Principle Underlying Antitrust Rules, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 435, 437 (2006).
24OECD, Competition on the Merits, Report DAF/COMP(2005)27, 17–18 (2005); ALISON
JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW 378–81 (2014).
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rather it is the use of market power toward monopolization of the market
(in U.S. terminology) or abuse (in EU terminology) that antitrust law
seeks to limit.25 Conduct that is deemed normal competition is safe from
antitrust liability, even if it is exercised by firms with market power.26
One would expect that for a concept that determines the very essence
of monopolization, greater certainty would have been achieved by now,
at least in major and established antitrust jurisdictions like the United
States or the European Union. Yet, the record on how to distinguish nor-
mal competition from monopolization is underwhelming. Existing tests
either lack definitional clarity and are vacuous, for they define
normal competition in a circular manner,27 or are too narrow since they
mandate a specific form of normal competition—competition on the
merits—which necessitates provable legitimate business justifications or
efficiencies.
The problem with vacuous tests is self-evident, namely, that they do
not provide any real guidance. To say that normal competition consists
in practices that do not “unfairly tend to destroy competition,”28 “are not
directed at smothering competition,”29 do not “substantially fetter
competition,”30 or do not “hinder the maintenance of the degree of com-
petition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition”31
is tautological and adds little clarity to the inquiry of what is normal.
25PINAR AKMAN, THE CONCEPT OF ABUSE IN EU COMPETITION LAW: LAW AND ECONOMIC
APPROACHES 96, 300–01 (2015); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 295–301 (2011); LAWRENCE SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTI-
TRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 111–18 (2016). It is important to note that this article does
not discuss contracts, collusion, or conspiracy.
26The EU competition law concept of special responsibility is clearly in tension with this
statement. While the concept is acknowledged, it is intentionally not accounted for here for
two reasons: First, because special responsibility is nebulous and practically impossible to
properly integrate in any other tool or concept of antitrust law, especially a new and experi-
mental one. Second, because the argument advanced here is jurisdiction-agnostic and thus
it is not necessary to limit it with regional controversies.
27Elhauge, supra note 7, at 261–68.
28Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).
29Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 275 (2d Cir. 1979).
30Case 6/72, Euroemballage Corp. v. Comm’n, 1973 E.C.R. 215 ¶ 26.
31Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 465, 541 ¶ 91.
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Unhelpful as vacuous tests are, they are at least innocuous in the sense
that they do not meaningfully influence the analysis of monopolization,
since they lack substance. The same cannot be said for all other remaining
tests, which make normal competition contingent on the showing of
“merit,” “business acumen,” “business justifications,” “superior product,”
or “efficiency,” among other similar terms. These proxies can be observed
and measured to some degree, and therefore they establish specific bench-
marks of what constitutes normal competition and monopolization. The
above benchmarks all converge toward what is collectively called competi-
tion on the merits, which requires a showing of legitimate business justifi-
cations or efficiencies.32 If this is true, and it is argued below that it is, then
there is an inextricable link between normal competition and competition
on the merits, such that the establishment of the monopolization offense
always depends on a showing of lack of legitimate business justifications or
efficiencies. This observation is problematic for standard antitrust law anal-
ysis because the conventional wisdom of antitrust law does not seem to rec-
ognize that normal competition is necessarily the same thing as
competition on the merits. A few more details are therefore due here,
before moving on to proving that all available nonvacuous tests on how to
distinguish between normal competition and monopolization require a
showing of legitimate business justifications or efficiencies.
To equate normal competition with competition on the merits is to say
that for firms to engage in normal competition they must restrict them-
selves only to the kind of competition on the merits accepted by the law.
This, paradoxically, turns the function of antitrust law on its head, from
a framework that enables free markets by prohibiting only specific anti-
competitive conduct33 to a framework that mandates a specific type of
competitive conduct—that which exhibits legitimate business justifica-
tions or efficiencies. This observation runs contrary to the commonly
shared intuition about how antitrust law works, which is that all conduct
is permissible normal competition unless it is shown that certain conduct
produces anticompetitive effects (setting aside the few exceptions of per
se illegality), at which point the challenged firm must defend its conduct
by proving that its conduct can be pardoned on the grounds of business
32For an overview, see generally OECD, supra note 24.
33Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect,
70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 371 (2002).
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justifications or efficiencies.34 In other words, the common intuition
seems to be that business justifications or efficiencies are a defense to an
established case of monopolistic behavior—not that business justifications
or efficiencies are an integral element of normal competition.
The prevailing intuition is misplaced. If the main goal of antitrust law,
as conventionally accepted, is to protect against consumer harm,35 this
harm must logically and necessarily be construed as net harm, namely,
residual harm that is borne by consumers after discounting it by the bene-
fits, such as business justifications or efficiencies, that the allegedly monop-
olistic conduct created. Therefore, to establish a case of monopolization
one would have to prove net harm.36 Otherwise, it would be enough to
simply point to any measure of harm, even if it is manifestly offset by ben-
efits, a trivial endeavor since virtually every competitive action results in
some sort of harm for at least some consumers.37 This position cannot be
saved by saying, as per above, that benefits resulting from conduct are
indeed taken into account, and it is just that the burden of proof lies
exclusively with the defendant firm. The allocation of burden of proof is a
procedural rule that serves purposes of practicality, efficiency, and broader
policy considerations; it is not a substantive rule that affects what needs to
be proven.38 Rebuttable presumptions employed in antitrust law have a
similar function—they automate decision-making by incorporating prior
knowledge on the net harm of certain practices as it has emerged through
prior case law and literature.39 Splitting the burden of proof and the
34The Microsoft and Kodak cases in the United States—discussed below—and the EU Com-
mission’s Guidance on Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union articulate this balance. See Commission Communica-
tion of Feb. 24, 2009, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings,
2009 O.J. C45/7.
35See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 1.
36AKMAN, supra note 25, at 280–83.
37See, e.g., Simon Cowan & Xiangkang Yin, Competition Can Harm Consumers, 47 AUSTL.
ECON. PAPERS 264–71 (2008).
38Andrew Gavil, Burden of Proof in U.S. Antitrust Law, 1 ISSUES COMP. L. & POL’Y
125, 126–28 (2008).
39Steven C. Salop, An Enquiry Meet for the Case: Decision Theory, Presumptions, and Evidentiary
Burdens in Formulating Antitrust Legal Standards (Nov. 6, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3025&context=facpub.
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creation of presumptions allow courts and authorities to establish a prima
facie case that involves anticompetitive conduct, yet is open to rebuttal if
the challenged firm produces evidence that had not been considered or
assessed properly in establishing the prima facie case. This is allowed to
economize on the prosecutorial process and to assist with legal certainty.
However, the rules regarding burden of proof and presumption do not
relieve courts and authorities of their duty to consider legitimate business
justifications and efficiencies as part of the initial assessment of monopoli-
zation; they simply lower the threshold of what needs to be proven to
establish the prima facie case.40 The unreasonable alternative would be
tantamount to asking the defendant firm to disprove an insufficiently
established allegation of monopolization.41
On close inspection neither theory nor practice define normal compe-
tition and monopolization separately and independently from justifica-
tions, efficiencies, and harm. These concepts are all intertwined in the
firm’s conduct such that normal competition today cannot conceptually
exist without a showing of business justifications or efficiencies. Conduct
that is linked to competitive harm, and that fails to demonstrate any justi-
fications on the merits—even if it shows neutral nonmerit justifications—
is unlikely to be considered normal competition.42 The consensus
described below characterizes both the U.S. and the EU jurisdictions and
is shared among courts and scholars alike.
Along those lines, perhaps the most famous test to distinguish between
normal competition and monopolization came from the U.S. Supreme
Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp., where the Court defined monopo-
lization as consisting in “the willful acquisition or maintenance of
[monopoly power] as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.”43 The Court did not provide much detail as to what this require-
ment entailed, perhaps because it concluded that the requirement was
clearly met insofar as the case concerned division of markets and price
40Gavil, supra note 38, at 129–31.
41AKMAN, supra note 25, at 280–81.
42See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2001); EIRIK ØSTERUD,
IDENTIFYING EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES BY DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS UNDER EU COMPETITION LAW:
THE SPECTRUM OF TESTS 42 (2010).
43384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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discrimination. It is evident, however, that the Court linked normal com-
petition to efficiencies and merit since it held that for conduct to be con-
sidered normal competition, it needs to be justified on the basis of
growth or development attributable to superior performance. Aspen Ski-
ing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.44 reflects similar thinking. That
case concerned a refusal to deal by a dominant firm for allegedly no rea-
son other than to eliminate a competitor. The district court’s instruction
to the jury on the question of monopolization—which was not challenged
on appeal—concerned the distinction “between practices which tend to
exclude or restrict competition on the one hand and the success of a
business which reflects only a superior product, a well-run business, or
luck, on the other.”45
Aspen Skiing, which affirmed the decision of the lower courts that
defendant had committed an antitrust violation, further added legitimate
business justifications as one of the main determinants of normal compe-
tition. In its jury instructions the district court specified that “if there
were legitimate business reasons for the refusal, then the defendant,
even if he is found to possess monopoly power in a relevant market, has
not violated the law…. [O]btaining or maintaining monopoly power can-
not represent monopolization if the power was gained and maintained
by conduct that was honestly industrial.”46 In Olympia Equipment Leasing
Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., a similar case concerning duties
between competitors, the Seventh Circuit ruled that “conjoined with
other evidence, lack of business justification may indicate probable anti-
competitive effect.”47
The landmark decisions by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in
AKZO v. Commission48 and Irish Sugar plc v. Commission49 also echo the
emphasis on meritorious competition by noting that “Article 86 of the
Treaty [now 102] prohibits a dominant undertaking from eliminating a
competitor and thereby reinforcing its position by having recourse to
44472 U.S. 585 (1985).
45Id. at 596.
46Id. at 597.
47797 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1986).
481991 E.C.R. I-3359.
491999 E.C.R. II-2975.
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means other than those within the scope of competition on the merits.”50
Similarly, in British Airways v. Commission, the Court of First Instance
stated that “the protection of the competitive position of an undertaking
which … occupies a dominant position must, at the very least, in order to
be lawful, be based on criteria of economic efficiency.”51
In United States v. Microsoft Corp. the D.C. Circuit held that firm conduct
that has been found to have anticompetitive effects can be excused if there
are “procompetitive justification[s],” which the court defined as “a non-
pretextual claim that [the monopolist’s] conduct is indeed a form of com-
petition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency
or enhanced consumer appeal.”52 And in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech-
nical Services, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court held that once evidence of
exclusionary action has been produced “[l]iability turns, then, on whether
‘valid business reasons’ can explain [the firm’s] actions.”53 These two cases
seem to reserve a separate step for the assessment of efficiencies and justi-
fications, and in that sense merit is not inextricably enshrined in the
inquiry of the firm’s conduct and whether it constitutes normal competi-
tion.54 The Microsoft court, in an effort to systematize prior case law, built
a three-step approach whereby plaintiffs must show that (1) a monopo-
list’s act has an anticompetitive effect,55 (2) the anticompetitive injury is
“of ‘the type that the [antitrust] statute was intended to forestall,’”56 and
then (3) “if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under [the
antitrust statute] by demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the
monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive justification’ for its conduct.”57
This distinction makes it look like the test of what constitutes normal com-
petitive conduct is self-contained in the second strand, while efficiencies
and justifications are exclusively a defense if the second strand is proven.
50Id. at 3021 ¶ 111.
51Case T-219/99, 2003 E.C.R. II-5925, at ¶ 280.
52United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
53504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992).
54Gavil, supra note 38, at 133.
55Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58–59.
56Id. (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487–88 (1977) and
quoting Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 202 (1967)).
57Id.
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This distinction may have made sense if the court had not used vague lan-
guage to determine the content of the normal competitive conduct
requirement in the second strand. With the conduct requirement out, the
question of what is normal and what is monopolizing conduct becomes a
nebulous mix of a conduct’s effects and justifications, and the only func-
tion these distinctions serve is to allocate the burden of proof, not to
determine what needs to be proven.
The tendency to condition normal competition on the basis of business
justifications and efficiencies is accepted by legal scholars as well.58 Nota-
bly, none of the available scholarly tests treats justifications and efficien-
cies simply as a defense to an otherwise defined concept of normal
competition. This validates the argument that merit is an integral and
indispensable element of normal competition.
One of the popular versions of the merit test is the equally efficient com-
petitor test, which asks whether the conduct under scrutiny is likely to
exclude rivals that are equally or more efficient than the dominant firm,
and if the answer is yes then the conduct is unlawful.59 Use of the test
has been popular in pricing abuse cases,60 although Judge Richard
Posner finds it appropriate as a generalized test.61 An alternative test, the
consumer welfare test, determines the merits of competitive conduct
regardless of how it compares with rivals’ efficiency. It instead balances
the efficiency gains from the business conduct under question, and the
potential harm to competition produced by it, and it prohibits the con-
duct if the harm outweighs the gains.62 The consumer welfare test does
58See generally Albert Foer, On the Inefficiencies of Efficiency as the Single-Minded Goal of Anti-
trust, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 103 (2015).
59OECD, supra note 24, at 29.
60See, e.g., Case 52/09 Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-564. See
also Martin Mandorff & Johan Sahl, The Role of the ‘Equally Efficient Competitor’ in the Assess-
ment of Abuse of Dominance 3–15 (Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Eco-
nomics 2013), http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/english/publications-and-
decisions/the-role-of-the-equally-efficient-competitor-in-the-assessment-of-abuse-of-
dominance.pdf.
61RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 194 (2001).
62OECD, supra note 24, at 31. See also Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Con-
sumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (2006); Steven
C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards, and
Microsoft, 7 GEORGE MASON L. REV. 617 (1999).
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not really escape the comparison problem, because it still needs to com-
pare welfare and efficiency gains and losses, and this has proven diffi-
cult.63 Professor Elhauge removes the balancing part altogether, and
focuses instead on the question of whether the conduct under scrutiny
furthers the firm’s dominant position by improving the firm’s efficiency
regardless of whether it also negatively affects rival efficiency, or if it fur-
thers the firm’s dominant position by impairing rival efficiency whether
or not it enhances the monopolist’s efficiency.64 In the former case, the
conduct is acceptable despite potential harm to competitors, whereas in
the latter case, the conduct is unacceptable despite incidental gains in
own efficiencies.
Other tests do not reserve a central role for efficiencies, yet, they still
incorporate them as a relevant factor. For instance, Professor Akman’s
definition of abuse of dominance is conduct that is exploitative, exclu-
sionary, and devoid of offsetting efficiencies that require balancing.65
Finally, the no economic sense test holds that conduct should be unlawful
if it makes no economic sense absent its tendency to eliminate or lessen
competition.66 While economic sense does not necessarily imply effi-
ciencies or business justifications, in practice it has been interpreted
that way.67
The merits of promoting business justifications and efficiencies are evi-
dent, and in that sense, one should celebrate their inclusion in normal
competition tests. But despite the benefits, one should question whether
it is good policy to rely on them as universal conditions. The following
part explains why the exclusive reliance on business justifications and
efficiencies generates underappreciated drawbacks.
63OECD, supra note 24, at 31; Elhauge, supra note 7, at 315.
64Elhauge, supra note 7, at 315.
65AKMAN, supra note 25, at 316–19.
66Gregory J. Werden, The No Economic Sense Test for Exclusionary Conduct, 31 J. CORP. L.
293 (2006). See also OECD, supra note 24, at 27.
67See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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II. BUSINESS JUSTIFICATIONS, EFFICIENCIES, AND THEIR
DISCONTENTS
Competition on the merits as developed through the numerous judicial
and scholarly tests discussed above is linked to heightened consumer wel-
fare and dynamic efficiency, both of which are significant metrics of a
well-performing economy.68 However, as competition on the merits
cemented itself as practically synonymous with normal competition, it left
little to no margin for competitive conduct that does not demonstrate
provable procompetitive business justifications or efficiencies.69 Banning
such conduct may still deprive society of practices that are neutral or
even procompetitive, just not in a way that competition on the merits
would recognize. Despite the universal acceptance, this part challenges
the complete dominance of business justifications and efficiencies as
proxies to normal competition.
A. Firm Activity Beyond Business Justifications and Efficiencies
The first problem with making valid business justifications and efficien-
cies a universal requirement to the finding of normal competition is one
of misalignment. Current tests suggest that competition authorities and
courts expect firms to compete on the grounds of superiority, progress,
innovation, efficiency, cost reduction, or more generally to have
procompetitive justifications for their market practices. From a policy
point of view, this seems appropriate as it is associated with the benefits
of welfare and dynamic efficiency maximization. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that at the same time and perhaps inadvertently, this requirement,
because it is universal, restricts firms to this specific type of competition
on the merits. The problem with that is that firms think about competi-
tion and their market strategy differently from antitrust law, not in terms
of efficiencies or “legitimate” justifications, but in terms of long-term sus-
tainability, and while the latter can be served by the former, that is not
68See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
69For reasons different than those identified herein, namely, the marginalization of competi-
tion as process rather than as outcome, Andriychuk also laments the obsession of antitrust
law with achieving efficiencies and welfare gains. See Oles Andriychuk, Can We Protect Com-
petition Without Protecting Consumers?, 6 COMP. L. REV. 77–87 (2010).
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always the case.70 As a result, the insistence on competition on the merits
creates a misalignment between the expectations of antitrust law and the
nature and purpose of the firm, undermining the effectiveness and legit-
imacy of antitrust law.
As was discussed in Part I, courts and regulators in antitrust matters
expect firms to win by outperforming competitors through practices that
promote efficiency or offer other procompetitive justifications. Since
there is no exact definition of how efficiencies and procompetitive justifi-
cations are to be construed, contextual details become useful. For exam-
ple, legitimate efficiencies and justifications are those that “increase social
welfare,”71 “make consumers [better] off in the long run,”72 or “preserve
proper economic incentives.”73 They also cannot simply be neutral or
serving the introducing firm. Instead, they must be positively
procompetitive, and their effects should spill over to consumers or the
market.74 In other words, while the economic incentives of firms are
taken into account, they are only valid as long as they also serve the
broader public in a positive way.
Firms have different motivations. While the broader public welfare is
an important consideration, it is only part of the equation. For corporate
financiers the traditional goal of the firm has been to serve its owners,75
and while newer approaches look more widely to include not just
70For a succinct summary, see Norman W. Hawker, The Public Policy of Antitrust and Strategy:
An Overview, 21 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 257 (2002).
71Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58.
72Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 379 (7th Cir. 1986).
73Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979).
74See, e.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 72. Similarly, in the European Union, efficiencies should
consist of the enhancement or the introduction of a new product or service, or in lowering
the price. They also need to be objective, cannot be purely internal but rather must trickle
down to consumers, and should not eliminate competition. See Commission, Guidelines on
the Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty 2004 O.J. (C101/08), 97, 97–118 [hereinafter
Commission Guidelines]. These guidelines may refer to agreements, but they have also been
deemed to apply to abuse of dominance. See, e.g., Case C-209/10, Post Danmark A/S
v. Konkurrencera˚det, 2012 E.C.R. 172, ¶¶ 40–41.
75Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1993); Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996). For the
business strategy perspective, see MICHAEL R. BAYE & JEFFREY T. PRINCE, MANAGERIAL ECONOM-
ICS AND BUSINESS STRATEGY (2014).
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shareholders but a broader community of stakeholders, including society
at large, a balancing of interests is required, and consumers or society
are not guaranteed to be the priority consideration.76 Behavioral theo-
ries of the firm further emphasize firms’ multitude of goals and interests,
which are expressed through the tussle among the constituent actors of
the coalition that forms the firm.77 Modern firm theory clarifies that
when serving these varied interests firms do not focus on short-term
profit maximization and the pricing mechanism in general.78 Instead,
they take a long-run approach that emphasizes long-term sustainability
leveraging the firm’s unique assets.79
Importantly, as the theory of the firm moved away from singular
short-term profit maximization and toward long-run strategic manage-
ment goals, it became apparent that a necessary element of sustainable
strategic business models was necessary to allow the firm to capture the
value of its choices, rather than let it dissipate into the value chain.80
Appropriability of value, rather than just value creation, is what sustain-
able business strategies and models should deliver, because otherwise
firms cannot capture returns on their investments.81 However, business
strategies and models that increase appropriability of value for the firm
can be in tension with consumers or other firms’ interests, since value
that is not captured by the firm is value that will be captured by con-
sumers or other firms.82
76R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (2010).
77RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963).
78EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE (1972).
79Paul F. Anderson, Marketing, Strategic Planning and the Theory of the Firm, 46 J. MKTG.
15, 15 (1982); Kathleen R. Conner & C.K. Prahalad, A Resource-Based Theory of the Firm:
Knowledge Versus Opportunism, 7 ORG. SCI. 477 (1996); Robert M. Grant, Toward A Knowledge-
Based Theory of the Firm, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 109, 109 (1996); Richard Nelson & Sidney
Winter, Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Economic Capabilities, 63 AM. ECON. REV.
440, 440 (1973).
80David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collabora-
tion, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 285 (1986).
81David J. Teece, Business Models, Business Strategy and Innovation, 43 LONG RANGE PLANNING
172 (2010).
82See Marco Ceccagnoli, Appropriability, Preemption, and Firm Performance, 30 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 81 (2008).
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Overall, firms do not decide their business strategy on whether every
one of their actions will promote progress, enhance efficiency, benefit con-
sumers, and leave room for competition. Instead, what drives corporate
strategy is long-term sustainability and appropriability of value. Sometimes
this will be achieved through innovations, technological progress, or
resource-economizing techniques, thereby aligning firms’ actions with the
type of competition on the merits that courts and authorities expect. How-
ever, other times it may not. For example, in Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit
scrutinized the exclusive dealing requirements Microsoft imposed on inde-
pendent software vendors. For Microsoft, these terms were important as
they were meant to “keep developers focused uponWindows.”83 However,
the D.C. Circuit, while recognizing that the agreements were not them-
selves anticompetitive, called their justification a “competitively neutral
goal” (emphasis added) and found an antitrust violation in the absence of
a procompetitive justification.84 This signaled a divergence between what
matters to companies and what courts are willing to consider.
The difference between legal and business thinking is also palpable in
the Google Search case. The European Commission (Commission) found
Google’s conduct abusive because Google “artificially reaped the bene-
fits” of the conduct, favorably positioning its own comparison shopping
service over those of its competitors to their likely detriment, as it did
not itself “invent comparison shopping.”85 Among Google’s arguments
was that its conduct was simply a matter of common business sense—
namely, that search engines compete in the market “by showing their
results, not results from other services [since] users do not expect search
services to provide results from other services,” and that its conduct was
necessary to allow it “to monetize space on its general search results
pages.”86 Google did not design its services to harm competition or force
83United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 72 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
84Id.
85Google Search, Commission Decision 2017 O.J. (C 4444), ¶ 343.
86Id. at ¶ 657. The same argument about commonness and monetization was also made in
the Google Android case. Google argued that its tying was similar to that performed by other
firms in the market and was essential for it to recoup the cost of maintaining the Android
ecosystem. See Geoffrey Manne, The EU’s Google Android Antitrust Decision Falls Prey to the Nir-
vana Fallacy, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (July 18, 2018), https://truthonthemarket.com/2018/07/
18/the-eus-google-android-antitrust-decision-falls-prey-to-the-nirvana-fallacy/.
186 Vol. 57 / American Business Law Journal
a choice upon consumers. Rather, the demise of competitors was the
result of users relying more on Google’s offering, which it introduced as
a way of maximizing the utility and value appropriability of its services.
Apparently, this was not a valid business justification for the Commission.
There are other examples of practices—primarily from the European
Union—that seemed to make complete business sense, were not targeted
at smothering competition, and did not eliminate competition but simul-
taneously did not advance the ideal of competition on the merits and
were therefore met with resistance from regualtors and courts. In BP
v. Commission, a case that concerned British Petroleum’s reduction of oil
supply to one of its occasional retailers during a period of extreme oil
shortage during the worldwide oil crisis of 1973–74, the Commission
found that this tactic was outside the scope of normal competition, partic-
ularly because BP had reduced its supplies to the complainant retailer to
a much greater extent than it had reduced those made to its regular cus-
tomers.87 The CJEU ultimately reversed the Commission’s decision,88
but the Commission’s decision stands as an example of the divergence
between what firms consider a legitimate business strategy
(i.e., prioritizing loyal retailers when production does not suffice for all)
and what courts and authorities are willing to allow. In United Brands
Co. v. Commission the CJEU scrutinized the decision of a producer to cut
off supply to a retailer who sided with competitors.89 The CJEU opined
that it was “necessary to ascertain whether the discontinuance of supplies
was justified”90 but ultimately ruled that this was a disproportionate mea-
sure. Without proof of any sinister plan or anticompetitive effect, it is
unclear why choosing to disassociate from a hostile retailer—a tactic that
admittedly does not subscribe to the competition on the merits model—
is not a legitimate business decision.91
87Commission Decision Relating to a Proceeding Under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty
(IV/28.841—Abg Oil Companies Operating in the Netherlands), 77/327/EEC, 1977
O.J.L. 117.
88Case 77/77, BP v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 1514.
89Case 27/76, 1978 E.C.R. 209.
90Id. ¶ 184.
91For a critique, see Per Jebsen & Robert Stevens, Assumptions, Goals and Dominant Undertak-
ings: The Regulation of Competition Under Article 86 of the European Union, 64 ANTITRUST L.J.
443 (1996).
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This mismatch between legal and business thinking might be
explained by the blind spot courts and regulators in antitrust matters
have for firms’ internal operations. They see firms as black boxes that
compete homogeneously against every other firm in the market. But far
from being mere competitive automata, firms have internal motives,
strategies, capabilities, weaknesses, cultures, and limitations that shape
their conduct in the market,92 and while they all share a common sur-
vival instinct, their ways of staying afloat are diverse and not limited to
any preconceived notion, whether efficiency, profit maximization, or
something else.93 It is indicative that the way business schools generally
teach about competition omits almost any reference to antitrust law, and
they often fail to link competition to efficiencies or a concept of legitimate
business justifications.94 As Albert Foer, former president of the Ameri-
can Antitrust Institute, reported on the findings of an investigation con-
ducted by the Institute on the relationship between business schools and
antitrust, “[w]hereas Chicago School economists tended to focus on theo-
retical models based on assumptions about how people act, the business
schools tended to focus on empirical understanding of what in fact works
in the marketplace—not the marketplace of ideas but the marketplace of
commerce.”95
There is, of course, no denying that antitrust law can place limits to
how firms can conduct themselves in the marketplace. The fact that a
course of action makes business sense does not mean it should be uncon-
ditionally allowed, and this is not what is suggested here. However, by
mandating competition on the merits, antitrust law does not simply place
92See, e.g., Jay B. Barney, Organizational Culture: Can It Be a Source of Sustained Competitive
Advantage?, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 656–65 (1986). Firms also consider legal strategy consider-
ation as an aspect of business strategy. See Robert C. Bird & David Orozco, Finding the Right
Corporate Legal Strategy, 56 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 81, 81–82 (2014) (discussing how law, in
general, can be used to achieve private strategic benefits rather than just compliance or risk
management-related goals); Larry A. DiMatteo, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source
of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 735 (2010) (“[C]ontract is the most flexible,
strategic tool that the law offers to the business community.”).
93On the variety and diversity of business goals and models, see Scott M. Shafer et al., The
Power of Business Models, 48 BUS. HORIZONS 199 (2005).
94Norman W. Hawker, Antitrust Insights from Strategic Management, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
67 (2003).
95Foer, supra note 58. See also Albert A. Foer, The Third Leg of the Antitrust Stool: What the Busi-
ness Schools Have to Offer to Antitrust, 47 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 21 (2003).
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limits on what companies can do; it rather imposes a specific obligation.
This inverts the function of antitrust law from a body of regulations that
starts from the free market assumption and carves out exceptions to a
body of regulations that directs how firms should operate in the market.
While the intentions behind this are benign, the result is that firms are
limited to a single form of competition, which undermines the effective-
ness and legitimacy of antitrust law.
Indeed, antitrust law, like any other form of regulation, is most effec-
tive when it is attuned to but not captured by its regulated base. As Pro-
fessors Ayres and Braithwaite have influentially argued, “regulation
[should] be responsive to industry structure in that different structures
will be conducive to different degrees and forms of regulation. Effica-
cious regulation should speak to the diverse objectives of regulated firms,
industry associations, and individuals within them.”96 If antitrust law
standards are out of touch with the realities of those that it regulates,
compliance becomes less likely in light of companies’ capacity for compli-
ance and their motivation for compliance—including economic, social, or
normative factors.97 This intuitive outcome can be traced back to neo-
institutional theory, which suggests that legal and regulatory norms
should be impacted by its regulated subjects and vice versa.98
It would be unfair to say that current antitrust standards completely
ignore the nature of the firm, but it is also hard to see how they can
claim to be workable when they, on the other hand, largely ignore what
firms do. In that sense, a test that prioritizes commonness, as opposed to
simply making it a relevant parameter, may seem like an extreme solu-
tion. While this is a fair point, at least three reasons justify the develop-
ment of a new test that revolves around commonness. The first is that
the commonness test has the potential to deliver better and more realistic
results than existing tests. The second justification is that mild proposals
may fail to generate the necessary change, similar to the chronic failure
of courts and regulators to assign more weight to efficiencies, as analyzed
below. More drastic proposals are therefore required to shift the
96IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE 4 (1995).
97CHRISTINE PARKER & VIBEKE LEHMANN NIELSEN, EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS RESPONSES
TO REGULATION (2011).
98W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2001).
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discussion. The third reason is that, even if the commonness test fails to
catch on, it will be the first workable alternative to the prevailing domi-
nance of merit and is therefore a step in the direction of recon-
ceptualizing how antitrust law relates to its subjects.
B. The Prohibitively High Threshold of Business Justifications and Efficiencies
Assuming that valid business justifications and efficiencies are a good
proxy to determine what constitutes normal competition and monopoli-
zation, a further difficulty emerges, this time with proving the alleged
justifications and efficiencies. If the relevant tests revolve around condi-
tions that are prohibitively hard to meet, then such tests are not correctly
calibrated to serve their goals. Indeed, business justifications and efficien-
cies are notoriously hard to prove, whether as a defense or as part of the
very definition of normal competition. It took an entire school of
thought—the Chicago School—to even bring legitimate business justifica-
tions and efficiencies to the table.99 As Professor Hovenkamp said,
Undoubtedly the most lasting legacy of the problems attending the New
Deal and the recovery was the increasing attempt by antitrust policy makers
after World War II to take efficiency concerns more seriously, and to recog-
nize that bigness and even a certain amount of oligopoly were a fact of
life.100
It is conventionally thought that prior to the rise of the Chicago
School, antitrust policy was dominated by a formalistic approach
informed mainly by ordoliberalism (in Europe) and the structure–con-
duct–performance model (in the United States), where the legality of
business conduct was assessed on the basis of predefined market struc-
ture conceptions. These included no dominant firms and low market
concentration, and any conduct that threatened this vision was deemed
anticompetitive.101 The Chicago School contested these automatic
99See Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S. Antitrust, in HOW THE CHI-
CAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON
U.S. ANTITRUST 11 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
100HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRAC-
TICE 75 (2011).
101James W. Meehan Jr. & Robert J. Larner, The Structural School, Its Critics, and Its Progeny:
An Assessment, in ECONOMICS AND ANTITRUST POLICY 182 (James W. Meehan Jr. & Robert
J. Larner eds., 1989); Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and
Antitrust, 127 U. PENN. L. REV. 1104 (1979).
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conclusions and insisted that business conduct should be outlawed only if
it was shown to have anticompetitive effects. Potential efficiencies and
legitimate business justifications were to be included in the assessment of
the net effects of business conduct.102 The United States was the first
jurisdiction to adopt the approach of the Chicago School. The Commis-
sion and the CJEU initially resisted this transition, but landmark policy
documents and decisions in the early 2000s were seen as a sign of
embracing this approach.103
The movement was successful because it moved a large number of
business practices out of the per se liability category and into the rule of
reason category, and proved—at least in theory—the potential
procompetitive effects of vertical and even some horizontal restraints.
This gave firms a chance to argue that some of their practices, which in
the past were considered unsalvageably anticompetitive, could survive
antitrust scrutiny if no anticompetitive effects were proven, or if the anti-
competitive effects were offset by procompetitive justifications or
efficiencies.
That last part, however, proved tricky. Firms discovered that practices
that had a measure of anticompetitive effects were next to impossible to
save, because courts and authorities never put much credence in legiti-
mate justifications and efficiencies, despite acknowledging them as a rele-
vant parameter.104 In a survey of all cases involving abuse of dominance
since 2009 (article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU)), Friederiszick and Gratz concluded that “[a]lmost every
firm that presented a justification in the Article 102 TFEU cases … failed
to convince the EU Commission of the justification’s relevance.”105
Indeed, in many landmark cases, including United Brands, BP, and Google
Search, the objective justifications or efficiencies offered by the defendant
102Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Harvard and Chicago Schools and the Dominant Firm, in HOW
THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
ON U.S. ANTITRUST 109 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
103See, e.g., ANNE C. WITT, THE MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO EU ANTITRUST LAW (2016).
104See Jean-Francois Bellis & Tim Kasten, Will Efficiencies Play an Increasingly Important Role
in the Assessment of Conduct Under Article 102 TFEU?, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 915, 918 (2010)
(stating that “[i]n effect, an efficiency-based argument is treated as a request for an exemp-
tion, an almost impossible burden to meet”).
105Hans Friederiszick & Linda Gratz, Hidden Efficiencies: The Relevance of Business Justifica-
tions in Abuse of Dominance Cases, 11 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 671, 680 (2015).
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firms were acknowledged but rejected by the Commission or the
CJEU.106 Part of the problem is that “the EU Commission’s decisions
have not included a transparent discussion of justifications”107—even
where the Commission addressed the justifications, it did not engage in a
detailed discussion. But the bigger challenge is that the standard of proof
required to accept such justifications is too high. The Commission
requires justifications for otherwise anticompetitive conduct to be prov-
able, indispensable, causally linked, and proportionate to the conduct,108
which makes the relevant claim to be construed “in such narrow terms
… that one wonders when it will be used at all.”109 The sentiment that
justifications and efficiencies are not easily proven is shared in the United
States as well. As Kattan notes “even today, one must search far and wide
to find a case in which efficiencies, described and analyzed as such,
trumped an anticompetitive story.”110 Much like in the European Union,
the problem is that once conduct has been found to have a measure of
anticompetitive effects, courts and regulators are hesitant to tolerate it in
the face of alleged justifications and efficiencies.111
In the end, sensing that efficiencies and justifications are not taken
seriously by courts and regulators, firms have ceased relying on them as
an argument to support their positions and rely instead on other aspects
of the monopolization offense. These include the absence of
106Loewenthal generally remarks that “[h]ardly a case has gone by before the European
Courts dealing with Article 82 that has not made some mention of ‘objective justification.’
It is therefore surprising to find that in not a single instance has either Court specifically
applied this defense in favour of a dominant undertaking alleged to have infringed that
provision by the Commission.” Paul-John Loewenthal, The Defence of “Objective Justification”
in the Application of Article 82 EC, 28 WORLD COMPETITION 455, 456 (2005).
107Friederiszick & Gratz, supra note 105, at 685.
108Commission Guidelines, supra note 74.
109Albertina Albors-Llorens, The Role of Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the Application
of Article 82 EC, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1727, 1758 (2007).
110Joseph Kattan, The Role of Efficiency Considerations in the Federal Trade Commission’s Antitrust
Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 613, 613 (1996).
111Id. See also United STATES DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, ¶ 10 (2010) (stating that “efficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify” and
“efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative or otherwise cannot
be verified by reasonable means”), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-
08192010#10
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anticompetitive effects or market power. In their survey, Friederiszick
and Gratz noted that only “47 percent of recent 102 TFEU cases an effi-
ciency defense or other justification was put forward and reported. We
consider this number to be low given that anticompetitive behavior and
justifications are intrinsically linked in Article 102 TFEU cases.”112
When firms forego efficiencies and justifications as useless argumenta-
tion, it may be time to reconsider whether they should remain as univer-
sal requirements to define normal competition. A standard that is so
hard to satisfy ends up trapping firms—especially successful firms who
risk antitrust action. The tragedy of the successful firm is that it is con-
fined either to patently innovative conduct that easily meets the on the
merits requirement or patently risk-free conduct that will allow it to
escape antitrust scrutiny. Anywhere between these two extremes is dan-
gerous territory for dominant firms.
The counterargument here is that tests that rely on justifications and
efficiencies are not badly designed—they are merely poorly executed.
Efficiencies and justifications are some of the right metrics to use, but the
challenge is how to better recognize and accept them. This is a fair point,
and if it can be done, it solves this particular problem. However, one
should question whether, even after decades of familiarization, courts
and regulators are better equipped to identify and accept justifications
and efficiencies.113 Business practices keep evolving and along with them
potential justifications. Business practices and innovation will always be
one step ahead of the law, and cautious courts and regulators will always
be somewhat resistant to novel firm claims.114 Even if it is easier to iden-
tify potential justifications and efficiencies that are grounded in economic
analysis, including the version of industrial organization endorsed by the
Chicago School, it is doubtful that judges and regulators are well posi-
tioned to assess justifications and efficiencies that are grounded in other
disciplines, such as technology, which is an increasingly defining aspect
112Friederiszick & Gratz, supra note 105, at 687 (citing support from additional scholars).
113See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?
The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2011);
Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 153, 162 (2010).
114Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984) (stating that
“[w]isdom lags far behind the market”).
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of how companies conduct themselves in the market.115 Therefore, while
making courts and regulators more responsive to claims of legitimate
business justifications and efficiencies would increase the appeal of com-
petition on the merits, this solution may not be feasible, and it does not
address the remainder of the problems explained herein.
C. Indeterminacy and Manipulation of Business Justifications and Efficiencies
A third problem with always requiring a showing of legitimate business
justifications or efficiencies is that these concepts have indeterminate con-
tent and can be manipulated. This reduces their reliability and conse-
quently increases the error cost of the tests that rely on them.
The problem has its roots in the inability of the antitrust community to
agree on the goals of antitrust law, which is a necessary step to determine
the prescriptive content of the law.116 When one chooses to focus on
legitimate business justifications and efficiencies, one essentially asks what
kind of justifications and efficiencies should be accepted by antitrust law
as compatible with its spirit and goals. Only those justifications and effi-
ciencies that are aligned with the goals of antitrust law should be
accepted. Unfortunately, disagreement besets this point, leaving firms,
courts, and regulators free to choose what best fits their interests or pre-
conceptions.117 In turn, reliance on a protean concept undermines the
endeavor of determining normal competition.
The various proposed goals of antitrust law are by now well docu-
mented. Bork, for instance, based on a historical analysis, argued that
antitrust law has only one concern—to increase economic efficiency—
and he rejected sociopolitical goals such as combating big businesses,
protecting small competitors, or wealth redistribution.118 If a firm man-
aged to achieve economies of scale so extensive that it could drive
115See, e.g., Konstantinos Stylianou, Systemic Efficiencies in Competition Law: Evidence from the
ICT Industry, 12 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 557 (2016) (discussing unaccounted efficiencies in large
technical systems).
116Robert Bork famously stated that “[a]ntitrust policy cannot be made rational until we are
able to give a firm answer to one question: What is the point of the law—what are its goals?
Everything else follows from the answer we give….” See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50 (1978).
117Marina Lao, Ideology Matters in the Antitrust Debate, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 649 (2014).
118Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7 (1966).
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competitors out of the market, Bork’s version of antitrust would see this
as normal competition and would allow it, even in the face of subsequent
exploitation of consumers by the successful firm. Bork’s view is not uni-
formly accepted. For other scholars—also relying on an analysis of anti-
trust’s original intent—legitimate business justifications and efficiencies
would have to be tied primarily to consumer welfare, which does not
fully overlap with economic efficiency.119 Under this view, for example,
the maintenance of price competition achieved through the protection of
less efficient competitors, who would otherwise be driven out, could take
priority over economic efficiency narrowly construed. Professor Fox
agrees that efficiency is a primary consideration, but she takes a broader
view of it to encompass the maintenance of “an environment congenial
to mavericks and upstarts; an environment that induces firms to be rival-
rous, to seek new ways to reduce their own costs, and to vie to meet
buyers’ wants.”120 In that light, legitimate competition would be the kind
that does not threaten the competitive process and addresses consumer
demand.
The problem here is that firms can make a reasonable argument that
the business practice they want to defend complies with one or more ver-
sions of the goals and spirit of antitrust law. For instance, a firm that
prices above predatory pricing levels, but below its profit maximizing
price at a level that deters entry, can legitimately claim that it abides by
the version of antitrust law that prioritizes low consumer prices in the
short term. However, by inhibiting the emergence of competition, it does
not promote the goal of sustaining the competitive process, and there-
fore it fails another version of antitrust law.121
Surely, courts can decline to adopt the firm’s preferred version of nor-
mal competition, but to the extent that multiple versions exist, antitrust
law’s deterrent message of what is forbidden in the market is diluted and
119John B. Kirkwood & Robert Lande, The Chicago School’s Foundation Is Flawed: Antitrust
Protects Consumers, Not Efficiency, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 89 (Robert Pitofsky
ed., 2008).
120Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK:
THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 77 (Robert Pitofsky
ed., 2008).
121See Donald F. Turner & Phillip E. Areeda, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 705–06 (1975).
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inevitably potentially ignored. It cannot be expected that firms will reject
a viable business plan because it somehow harms competition according
to one test, but not necessarily another—particularly in a world where
naturally “executives may think no further than ‘let’s get more
business.’”122
The ambiguity concerning which business justifications and efficiencies
constitute normal competition opens the door for manipulation of the
concept. Once firms choose which version of normal competition serves
their interests, they have an advantage over prosecutors and regulators
seeking to prove their case, because it is the internal operation of the
firm that generates efficiencies and explains business conduct, and no
one knows the internal operation of the firm better than the firm
itself.123 Indeed, it is virtually impossible for any external observer to
have more information about the internal working of firms than firms
themselves, and therefore firms will always be in a position to package
their actions in a way that maximizes the appearance of legitimacy and
efficiency.124 They may very well fail, as nothing compels courts and reg-
ulators to endorse firms’ positions. But the point here is not that firms
will always manage to convince courts and regulators of their views, tak-
ing advantage of the information asymmetry; rather, if courts and regula-
tors rely exclusively on subjective and internal-to-the-firm metrics to
determine normal competition, they are vulnerable to manipulation.
To counter this risk, courts and regulators can become suspicious of
firms’ claims and raise the level of scrutiny to ensure that procompetitive
justifications and efficiencies do exist. While possible, this may result in a
prohibitively high threshold, a problem identified just above. Like Jason
caught between the Symplegades, courts and regulators find themselves
122Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232 (1st Cir. 1983).
123Philip Lowe, Consumer Welfare and Efficiency—New Guiding Principles of Competition Policy?,
13th International Conference on Competition and 14th European Competition Day, at
8 (2007) (stating that “[s]ometimes a complainant will help us [the Commission] to put
together some arguments, but he will usually have more limited access to information than
the defendant, the dominant undertaking. This makes it very challenging to gauge in a spe-
cific case the consequences, efficiencies or others, of a challenged practice.”), https://ec.
europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2007_02_en.pdf.
124Anticipating antitrust scrutiny, firms can take steps to shroud their practices in a veil of
legitimacy. See Oliver Heil & Arlen Langvardt, The Interface Between Competitive Market Sig-
naling and Antitrust Law, 58 J. MKTG. 81, 93–94 (1994).
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in a situation where they need to balance between avoiding manipulation
and avoiding excessive strictness.125 The former undermines the quality
of judicial and administrative enforcement; the latter disrupts industry
operation. It is in this context that incorporating an additional external
to the firm element—commonness—can help better calibrate enforce-
ment intensity.
III. THE COMMONNESS TEST
So far, I have established two claims that set the groundwork for the
commonness test. First, that all nonvacuous monopolization tests revolve
around competition on the merits, which requires a showing of legiti-
mate business justifications or efficiencies. Second, that despite its univer-
sal acceptance, competition on the merits suffers unaccounted for
weaknesses, which make it misaligned with market realities, unrealisti-
cally hard to satisfy, and easy to manipulate.
To correct for these weaknesses, what is suggested here is the adoption
of an additional proxy—a practice’s commonness in the market—which
would take precedence over, but not replace, business justifications and
efficiencies in distinguishing normal competition from abusive, monopo-
lizing competition. It will be argued that incorporating the commonness
element as a precheck to business justifications and efficiencies enhances
the inquiry of which practices should constitute normal competition and
can therefore escape monopolization liability. To prove this point, the
commonness test is analyzed relative to existing tests in an error cost
framework, namely, a framework that considers which test delivers better
results under conditions of uncertainty. This is necessary, because the
decision regarding the legality of practices depends on a finding of which
practices promote the chosen goals of antitrust law and which do not,
something that is impossible to determine with certainty. Therefore, the
function of the relevant tests is to minimize errors when choosing
between the two outcomes.
125The Symplegades were a pair of rocks in Greek mythology that clashed together every
time a ship sailed through. Jason and the Argonauts successfully navigated through them,
after which point the Symplegades remained forever open. The allegory is used to describe
difficult predicaments, often between two equally bad choices. See William F. Pickard, The
Symplegades, 34 GREECE AND ROME 1 (1987).
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Some might argue that the commonness of a business model is already
taken into account, and therefore the commonness test does not add
anything new. As reasonable as this might sound, it is not accurate,
because the level of generality at which courts and regulators examine
the role of business practices is very high. For example, in Microsoft the
D.C. Circuit considered the question of whether and how “technologi-
cally dynamic markets” merit different antitrust analysis,126 but this is
not the same question as whether Microsoft’s conduct was justified with
regard to how firms compete in technologically dynamic markets.
Similarly, in Irish Sugar the CJEU alluded to taking into account mar-
ket features by stating that normal competition and abuse of dominance
are judged “on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators”
and “it is necessary to consider all the circumstances,” but it stopped
short of specifying these elements and in particular of tying them to the
commonness of business practices.127 In British Airways, that airline
argued that its practices were common in the industry, but it did so in
relation to a nondiscrimination argument, not a normal competition
argument.128 The argument was in any case rejected. On the other hand,
in Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. the Supreme Court appeared to
consider common business models by acknowledging that in utilities
markets long-term exclusive supply contracts may be necessary,129 and
this may be the closest the Court has come to incorporating commonness
within its antitrust jurisprudence.
In short, the standard practice of the industry is still not sufficiently
accounted for. The proposed reconceptualization gives commonness of
the challenged business practice a centerpiece position. As this is a major
departure from current antitrust law analysis, a step-by-step description
is required. The following section first recasts normal competition/
monopolization tests as error tests, then explains how the commonness
test works, and finally compares results with existing tests to show how
the commonness test can deliver welfare-enhancing results. However,
the value of the commonness test is not simply to serve as a standalone
126United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
127Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar PLC v. Comm’n, 1999 E.C.R. II-2975, ¶¶ 111 and 114.
128Case T-219/99, 2003 E.C.R. II-5925, ¶ 59.
129365 U.S. 320 (1961).
198 Vol. 57 / American Business Law Journal
alternative test. It is also to highlight commonness as a pertinent parame-
ter of normal competition, even if one is not prepared to make common-
ness the centerpiece parameter.
A. Monopolization Tests as Error Tests
Part I presented the various versions of monopolization tests available.
Yet, little guidance can be sought in courts’ reasoning, since courts never
explain why they choose one definition of monopolization over another.
They just select one, usually bound by precedent, and then proceed to
apply it to the case facts. Scholarly discussions, while often good at argu-
ing in favor of or against specific tests, generally fail to explain the supe-
riority of their choice relative to other tests. Scholarly discussions often
explain why their preferred or proposed test is better to distinguish
between pro- and anticompetitive conduct, but they do not discuss the
question of better in relative terms. Since they all acknowledge that an
error margin and a degree of uncertainty in their premises and assess-
ment is inevitable,130 what metrics do they use to compare their results
to those of other tests?131 Without a framework to compare expected
results of adopting different tests, we can have a discussion of the merits
and shortcomings of different tests, but we cannot have a meaningful
way of deciding among them.
It is suggested here that a useful and necessary way to think about
monopolization tests is as an error cost assessment.132 Any inquiry into
the legitimacy of business conduct is essentially an attempt to predict the
effects of the challenged conduct on the chosen objectives of antitrust law
to maximize welfare under conditions of imperfect information.133
130See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 7, at 316, 320. See also Salop, supra note 62, at 313, 343;
Werden, supra note 66, at 320–22.
131Salop’s consumer welfare test analysis stands as an exception, insofar as it uses a frame-
work similar to the one advocated for herein. See Salop, supra note 62, at 343.
132Of the relevant literature that discusses error cost frameworks in antitrust, only Evans
and Padilla (and Salop) use them to decide among specific normal competition tests; the
rest use them to analyze false positive and false negative errors in antitrust generally. See
Evans and Padilla, supra note 22; Salop, supra note 22.
133C. Frederick Beckner III & Steven C. Salop, Decision Theory and Antitrust Rules, 67 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 41 (1999); James C. Cooper et al., Vertical Antitrust Policy as a Problem of Inference,
23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639 (2005); Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Divergence and
the Limits of Economics, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 253 (2010).
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Ideally, when reviewing business conduct we would seek to have perfect
information on how the challenged conduct affects welfare. If the effect
is neutral or positive, then we would allow the practice, and if the effect
is negative, we would ban the practice. But reality is plagued with inde-
terminacy, human capacity is limited by bounded rationality, and full
direct observation of effects is impossible.134 We cannot know with cer-
tainty the effects of business conduct, because it is impossible to authori-
tatively determine the scope of the effects, and the effects are impossible
to accurately quantify.135
In this light, monopolization tests become an exercise of choice under
conditions of uncertainty. Therefore, all tests are bound to deliver a mea-
sure of false results, either in the form of false positives or in the form of
false negatives. In turn, the choice of which test is preferable is a choice
about minimizing error cost.136 In other words, once we accept that all
these tests can do is help courts and regulators estimate whether a cer-
tain business practice promotes or undermines welfare (or any other
chosen goal of antitrust), the focus shifts to developing a test that delivers
estimates that are as close to the actual, but not fully observable effects as
possible.
This conceptualization of monopolization tests has an important
implication—it makes it necessary to examine and decide among tests
through an error framework.137 An error framework compares tests on
the basis of the decision-making factor they employ, and determines
which test has the lowest error footprint based on a number of
relevant factors. Without it, any comparison and any decision among
tests is anecdotal. Seen through an error framework, monopolization
tests are tests that use a proxy—the decision-making factor to help us
estimate or predict the effects of the challenged practice on consumer
134Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Techno-
logical Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1028–30 (1987). On the topic of bounded rationality,
see Brian W. Arthur, Inductive Reasoning and Bounded Rationality, 84 AM. ECON. REV.
406, 406 (1994).
135See Beckner & Salop, supra note 133, at 49–52; Manne & Wright, supra note 113, at
158–60.
136The design of any legal rule or standard can be seen as a way to minimize error. See Isaac
Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
257 (1974).
137See Salop, supra note 62, at 343–45.
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welfare.138 Everything else equal, the closer that estimate is to the actual
welfare effects under conditions of perfect information, the smaller the
error footprint, and the better the test. The various tests differ from each
other in that they adopt different proxies, and therefore the best test is
the one that employs the proxy that leads to the smallest error footprint.
As discussed above, existing tests have converged around the proxy of
legitimate business justifications and efficiencies. The following
section explains why introducing commonness as a priority proxy can
enhance the results of the normal competition versus monopolization
heuristic.
B. Description and Overview of the Commonness Test
The reconceptualization of monopolization proposed here centers on the
idea that the commonness of a business practice in the market in which it
occurs should be examined before considering the question of whether
the practice is supported by legitimate business justifications and efficien-
cies.139 The commonness test, therefore, builds on and complements,
rather than replaces, existing tests, because if a practice fails the com-
monness check, it still must pass one of the existing tests. The proposal is
FIGURE 1. The Commonness Test.
138While not universally accepted, welfare protection as antitrust’s predominant goal is
today’s dominant view. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 1.
139Before examining commonness, the test also requires that the challenged practice is not
designed to harm competition, a condition that is examined infra Part III.C.2.
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predicated on an error framework analysis that shows that giving prece-
dence to commonness results in a smaller error footprint compared to
the exclusive use of business justifications and efficiencies.
The commonness test comprises two steps (see Figure 1). The first step
is to ask whether the practice under question is designed to harm
competition—which is not the same as being likely to harm competition.
If it is not designed to harm competition, then the test asks whether the
business practice under scrutiny is common in the market in which it
occurs. If the practice is common and not designed to harm competition,
then it should be considered normal competition and therefore not be
deemed illegal monopolization without requiring a showing of business
justifications or efficiencies, as is required under the current tests. If it is
not common, then the examiner may revert to the test of choice from
the ones currently available. The commonness test therefore serves as a
precheck before any of the existing tests are applied. Since commonness
is a matter of degree, there is no cut-off point after which the common-
ness test fully takes over. Rather, the more common a practice is, the less
important business justifications and efficiencies become, and vice versa.
Since the investigation into commonness precedes the investigation
into justifications and efficiencies, the integration of the commonness
parameter results in the clearance of practices that exhibit zero, weak, or
unclear legitimate business justifications or efficiencies but that are not
designed to harm competition. It is evident that incorporating the com-
monness parameter does not materially affect practices that come with
clear and provable justifications and efficiencies, since these would likely
pass existing tests anyway. Its effect is more pronounced in that it guards
against outlawing practices that do not conform to competition on the
merits as understood by current tests. This should not be read to mean
that the test shields harmful practices, since, as mentioned in Part II.A,
the fact that firms may be found not to engage in competition on the
merits does not mean that their conduct is harmful to competition.
Moreover, the test forbids anticompetitive motivations, which serves as
an additional backstop.
C. Elements and Assessment of the Commonness Test
A number of issues concerning the structure and function of the test
need to be addressed here in more detail. First, how should commonness
be defined and why is it a good proxy for legitimate competition?
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Second, how can practices that are designed to harm competition be
identified, and why does this parameter matters? Third, as seen through
an error test framework, does the added commonness parameter
enhance the heuristic of distinguishing between normal competition and
monopolization, and if it does so, why? These issues are addressed in
sequence below.
1. Choice and Definition of Commonness
The element of commonness is chosen to respond to the shortcomings of
various competition on the merits tests. It does so by acknowledging and
justifying practices that are aligned with business and market realities,
and by serving as an external-to-the-firm parameter that cannot be uni-
laterally manipulated.140
The main premise is that the observation of commonness of a business
practice provides a strong indication that the practice is well adapted to
the needs and features of the relevant market, because multiple firms
rationally and independently141 think that the practice ensures their sur-
vivability. Firms do not compete in a vacuum, and they do not compete
in the same way across markets. Their practices are shaped by the con-
text in which they compete as a response to market characteristics and to
competition from other firms.142 Both internal capabilities of the firm
and environmental factors shape firm conduct, and in that sense firm
conduct is a reflection of the firm’s best response—given its capabilities—
to the external industry conditions and characteristics the firm takes for
granted.143
Numerous practices that have been challenged by law are supported
by managerial economics on the basis of the specific characteristics of
140Collective manipulation through tacit coordination is theoretically possible. The error
cost here would be discounted by the fact that eventually such arrangements would likely
fail the test as being “designed to harm competition,” in which case the examiner would
revert to any of the existing tests (see Part III.C.2).
141As mentioned, normal competition is a concept that applies in the monopolization/abuse
of dominance domain, not restraints of trade/agreements.
142MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND
COMPETITORS (2004); Jay B. Barney, Types of Competition and the Theory of Strategy: Toward an
Integrative Framework, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 791 (1986).
143Richard R. Nelson, Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does It Matter?, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
61 (1991).
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given markets. For example, in markets characterized by large upfront
investments and low marginal costs, price discrimination is accepted as
an advisable business practice.144 In industries characterized by network
effects, displacement often comes in successive waves of dominant firms,
and therefore it is natural for firms to wish to dominate the market for
the duration of their transient reign.145 And depending on the stage of
evolution of the industry, firms may find it necessary to vertically inte-
grate or disintegrate to respond to market characteristics.146
Such common business models and practices may appear anticompeti-
tive by current standards, but their propagation across firms can indicate
that they are necessary to capture value, without which firms cannot
exist. Professor Teece has explained at length how restrictive business
arrangements of the kind antitrust law scrutinizes may be necessary to
allow firms to appropriate the value they generate when commercializa-
tion requires working with complements.147 Without arrangements to
exercise control, value may be captured by the complements, rather than
the firm that enables the complements. For example, Google’s practice
of showing comparative shopping results sourced by itself and not by
third parties on the general results page was motivated by the desire to
capture the value of its search services, instead of letting it dissipate to
complementary services. Google explained in Google Search that it was
standard practice for search engines to compete in the market “by show-
ing their results, not results from other services [since] users do not
expect search services to provide results from other services,” and that
its conduct was necessary to allow it “to monetise space on its general sea-
rch results pages.”148 The Commission disagreed, counterarguing that a
nondiscrimination requirement “does not generally prevent [Google]
144CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK
ECONOMY 37–39 (1999).
145Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs
and Network Effects, in III HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Mark Armstrong &
Robert Porter eds., 2007).
146See, e.g., Michael G. Jacobides, Industry Change Through Vertical Disintegration: How and
Why Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 465 (2005) (discussing the fac-
tors of (dis)integration in the banking market).
147Teece, supra note 80.
148Google Search, Commission Decision 2017 O.J. (C 4444), ¶ 657 (emphasis added).
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from monetising its general search results pages. Google can choose the
specific measures through which it intends to comply with [the Commis-
sion’s decision] and the possible measures Google might take do not pre-
clude the monetisation of its general search results pages when making
this choice.”149
None of the above is to say that antitrust law’s interests should always
be the same as common business interests. It is indeed possible that some
common business models will be welfare reducing, and therefore run
afoul of antitrust law. Because of the error margin in normal competition
tests, this possibility exists regardless of which test one chooses. Whether
the commonness test delivers better results than existing tests is dis-
cussed in Part III.C.3. Moreover, at least according to one historical
understanding of abuse, a practice cannot be abusive if it can also be
exercised by nondominant firms.150 While this approach applies even in
cases where a practice is exercised by one nondominant firm, the logical
extension is that if more than one nondominant firm engages in a prac-
tice the practice is by definition not abusive and therefore normal
competition.
The second way commonness enhances the heuristic process of dis-
tinguishing between normal competition and monopolization is by serv-
ing as an external-to-the-firm parameter. Commonness is assessed by
looking at the market, not inside the firm, and therefore does not
depend on the challenged firm’s own understanding of commonness.
This guards against manipulation,151 because commonness is a question
of fact, not law, and is not susceptible to predispositions and ideology,
like legitimate business justifications or the elusive factor of efficiencies.
Some definitional elements of commonness further help justify its
choice: how is commonness measured, what is the referenced practice,
and how is the market defined? Commonness refers to how widespread
a challenged business practice occurs in the market. It should be
expected that there is no fixed percentage, over which a practice is con-
sidered common, as this would be arbitrary. One solution would be to
specify strata of certainty similar to Judge Hand’s guidance on monopoly
149Id. at ¶ 664.
150AKMAN, supra note 25, at 319.
151As stated earlier, collective manipulation through tacit coordination is theoretically
possible.
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levels in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, where he opined that
“ninety percent is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful
whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be enough; and certainly
thirty-three per cent is not.”152
The equivalent formulation in the commonness test would be to say
that above a certain percentage, a practice is always considered common,
below a certain percentage a practice is never considered common, and
then acknowledge that there is a grey zone, wherein the specifics of the
market are also determinative. This is not a preferred solution in the
case of the commonness test, both because it is impractical and because
of its distorting effects. Unlike market share calculation, where the mea-
sured element is readily identifiable as sales, units, or volume that are
relatively easy to measure, determining whether all, or a large represen-
tative sample of, businesses engage in the practice that is being chal-
lenged would be cumbersome. This is because evaluative judgments
would be required. Moreover, it would not be informative because it
would compare disparate situations. To the extent that different compa-
nies are positioned differently in the market, their adoption of the same
business practice may not necessarily be instructive as to what is “nor-
mal” in the industry.
Instead, commonness should be assessed by reference to how wide-
spread a business practice is among close competitors of the challenged
company. The circle of close competitors indicates similarly situated firms
and therefore a more meaningful point of comparison.153 Antitrust law
acknowledges that, because the vast majority of markets encompass dif-
ferentiated products and services, competitive closeness rather than
mere quantitative measurements provides a better view of the challenged
company’s positioning in the market. 154 Therefore, when the common-
ness test seeks to align what is competitively legitimate with what is com-
petitively common, the reference point of commonness should be
152148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
153Thomas Buettner, Closeness of Competition from an Economic Perspective, 7 J. EUR. COMP.
L. & PRAC. 690 (2016); David Levy & James Reitzes, Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Mar-
kets with Localized Competition, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427 (1992).
154U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §
4 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010#10; Council
Regulation 139/2004 (EC) of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L. 24) ¶ 28.
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commonness among those companies that are competitively similar. This
also makes the test manageable as it limits the inquiry to a small number
of competitors, rather than the potentially very large number of all com-
panies in the market.
Not all markets are conducive to a competitive closeness type of analy-
sis. The test obviously works best in large markets with numerous partici-
pants who span a spectrum of competitive positioning. The test also
works in oligopolistic markets as long as some competitors exhibit com-
petitive closeness. For instance, in an oligopolistic market of five compa-
rable companies each having around twenty percent market share, a
business practice that is adopted by four of them can be considered com-
mon. In a more complex example, in the Google Android case, Google’s
practice of bundling applications on its mobile operating system was
identical to what Apple, Microsoft, and Blackberry did. Even though the
market comprised essentially only four players (with smaller competitors
accounting for less than two percent of the market at all times), and even
if their market shares were markedly different—with Microsoft never
achieving more than five percent, while Android, at the time of the case,
came closer to sixty percent—the overall technological proximity of these
firms and their overall capabilities and size outside of the mobile operat-
ing system market could well qualify them as close competitors.155 The
Google Android case also shows that even in highly innovative and relative
young markets, there may still be a sufficient number of close competi-
tors to make the test applicable.
A related example can be sourced from the failed early litigation
against MySpace and Facebook, whereby the two dominant social net-
works were accused of exclusionary conduct by preventing competitors
from using their platform.156 Even though at the time of litigation the
two companies were only a few years old, their noninteroperable busi-
ness model was sufficiently discernible to establish a class of close com-
petitors, which at the time included Friendster, hi5, Orkut, and others. It
is, of course, entirely possible that there will be industries where close
155See Konstantinos Stylianou, Exclusion in Digital Markets, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 181, 202–10, 243–51 (2018) (discussing technological proximity and the ease of
cross-market entry).
156LiveUniverse, Inc. v. MySpace, Inc., 304 Fed. App’x 554 (9th Cir. 2008); Facebook, Inc.
v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-5780 JF (RS), 2009 WL 3429568 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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competitors do not exist or do not adopt the challenged practice, and in
these cases the commonness test is unhelpful. A final possibility involves
industries where only nonclose competitors adopt the challenged prac-
tice. While this could still be indicative of commonness, it is methodologi-
cally sounder to consider the test inapplicable in these instances.
Commonness, therefore, is a composite index that relies on a quantita-
tive measurement within a qualitatively selected subsegment of the mar-
ket comprised of a challenged company’s close competitors. Competitive
closeness is traditionally identified by looking at who companies consider
to be their main competitors. Evidence includes companies listed in their
annual reports, surveys among other companies in the market, bidding
trends, and economic analysis (including natural experiments).157 Ulti-
mately, the larger the assessed base of close competitors and the higher
the percentage of adoption within that base, the more robust the result.
In that sense, the implications of the commonness test are a matter of
degree—the more common a practice, the less important business justifi-
cations and efficiencies become. This kind of sliding scale ensures that
the commonness parameter is integrated smoothly into existing tests and
takes over only insofar as its findings become robust.
One last definitional element remains—how to properly define the
practice and the market in which the practice occurs. In Google Android
the question could be phrased, in ascending order of generality, whether
it is common to bundle an application with other applications, to bundle
apps in the Android market, to bundle apps in the mobile software mar-
ket, to bundle apps in the software market, to bundle products and ser-
vices in the computer industry market, or to bundle products and
services generally. The level of generality affects the scope within which
the investigation seeks commonness. The answer would usually be obvi-
ous from the scope of the inquiry itself as launched by courts and author-
ities. For example, in Google Android the investigation focused, inter alia,
on bundling between Google Play and other mobile apps.158
Market definition will then reveal the boundaries within which investiga-
tors will look for commonness. It is beyond the purpose of the test to feed
into the process of market definition, but as a general matter, it seems right
157Malcolm B. Coate, The Use of Natural Experiments in Merger Analysis, 1 J. ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT 437 (2013).
158Google Android, Commission Decision 2019 O.J. (C402) 19–22, ¶ 4.
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to focus on the practice at the product or service level of abstraction in the
market in which the practice occurs as a primary market. This is because
the test aims to give weight to the factors that most directly shape the
method of competition of firms—predominantly, their immediate market
surroundings in the relevant product or service market. Broader investi-
gation beyond the market in which the practice occurs can be appropriate
if the conditions underlying certain behavior in secondary markets are
similar to those in the primary market. For example, if we accept that
long-term exclusive supply contracts in electricity supply markets can be a
common practice,159 to the extent that an argument can be made that the
electricity and water supply markets are similar because both are utilities
markets, evidence of the commonness of long-term exclusive contracts in
either of those markets can be used complementarily.
2. Not Designed to Harm Competition
Prior to investigating commonness, the test requires us to ask whether
the challenged practice is designed to harm competition. If it is, the prac-
tice fails the test, and the examiner reverts to another test of their choice.
If it is not, the examiner proceeds to investigate commonness. The utility
and necessity of this step is obvious. It ensures that certain practices, no
matter how common, will not qualify as normal competition given their
pernicious nature as signaled by the fact that their success is predicated
on harming competition. As a result of this step, companies cannot count
on normalizing behavior that is designed to harm competition by
adopting it en masse in an effort to subvert the commonness test, even if
they do so independently from each other. If they do it in concert, they
would most certainly be engaging an anticompetitive agreement. On the
other hand, the test never filters out potentially procompetitive practices,
because even if it erroneously catches a practice that is, in reality, not
designed to harm competition (false positive), the result is that examiners
revert to another test of their choice, as explained above.
Harm to competition is chosen here under the assumption that
antitrust law aims to protect competition in order to serve the ulti-
mate goal of safeguarding consumer welfare.160 Yet, even if one were
159See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
160Brodley, supra note 134. See also Alan Devlin, A Neo-Chicago Perspective on the Law of Prod-
uct Tying, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 521, 524–30 (2007).
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to choose the protection of competitors (instead of the protection of
competition) as the preferred proxy,161 the step could also be
reformulated as “not designed to harm competitors.” The protection
of competitors, however, as the primary goal of antitrust law is a
minority view.
It may appear that the questions of which practices are designed to
harm competition (first step of the commonness test) and which practices
are anticompetitive because they are monopolistic (the full commonness
test) are one and the same. If that were the case, then this first step of
the commonness test and the commonness test as a whole would be con-
flated. Despite this seeming logical circularity, the step of checking
whether a practice is designed to harm competition is simpler and
narrower in scope. It only aims to check for and filter out practices with
the objective of harming competition, and therefore the elimination of
competition is an integral part of the overall design. Situations where the
elimination of competition is a by-product (rather than a design element)
are not caught at this step.
’For instance, predatory pricing would fail this step, because a neces-
sary premeditated component of profitable predatory pricing—and
therefore part of the overall design—is below-cost pricing to eliminate
competition first.162Another example of a practice that would fail this
step is Microsoft’s actions to actively undermine Sun’s implementation
of Java on Windows, which had no other purpose but to taint Sun’s
Java compatibility.163 On the contrary, the development of a new prod-
uct that can be profitable only if it is so effective that it excludes com-
petitors would pass this step, because the elimination of competition
comes as the consequence of the product’s effectiveness, rather than as
an intended aspect of its development.164 In the former case, the per-
petrator takes affirmative steps toward the elimination of competition,
whereas in the second case, the perpetrator accepts or even hopes for
161See Robert Pitofsky, Political Content of Antitrust, U. PENN. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (1978) (dis-
cussing the distinction between protection of competition and protection of competitors).
162Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239,
2267 (2000).
163United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
164See, e.g., OECD, supra note 24, at 26.
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the elimination of competition but does not actively take steps that spe-
cifically aim at that.
The element of intent is clearly present here. The assessment con-
siders the obvious structure of the challenged conduct as it appears to
the reasonable observer, but also the intent and proffered justifications
for the conduct. These are essential in understanding what the firm is
aiming to achieve165 but do not need to be “legitimate” the same way
existing tests understand them.
The role of intent in antitrust law analysis is controversial, but not in
a way that affects the use of intent in the commonness test. Those who
reject intent argue that a company’s state of mind is irrelevant in the
inquiry of what antitrust law should focus on. Further, the state of mind
is also misleading since it is indistinguishable from legitimate and desir-
able competitive aggressiveness.166 Those who support examining
intent argue that the dangers are overstated, and that it is essential to
form a comprehensive opinion about the challenged conduct.167 Either
way, the function of intent in existing competition on the merits tests is
different from that in the commonness test. In existing tests, intent is
used to assist to find a violation where effects are not fully established
and may yield false positive errors. However, in the commonness test,
intent only serves to determine whether the commonness test is applica-
ble. Failing that step only results in the test declaring itself inapplicable,
at which point examiners revert to an existing test of their choice. In
that sense, the element of intent in the commonness test enhances the
test’s results but does not contribute to raising the error cost rate, as is
the case in current tests. Therefore, any potential criticisms against the
use of intent in current antitrust analysis are attenuated in relation to
the commonness test.
165See Werden, supra note 66, at 416–17. This step is somewhat similar to the no economic
sense test. However, the no economic sense test differs in that it does not distinguish
between the elimination of competition as part of an intended design or as a consequence,
and creates exceptions for conduct that is socially beneficial or enhances consumer welfare.
166Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO STATE L.J. 1035, 1039 (2000).
See also A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th
Cir. 1989).
167Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (2000); Marina
Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust Intent and Sacrifice, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 171 (2005).
2020 / Redefining Monopolization 211
3. Commonness Versus Competition on the Merits in an Error Test
Framework
The previous step filters out business practices that are hostile to the
competitive fabric of the industry on account of the practices’ intended
design. Most practices, though, would not fall in this category, and would
in any case fail existing tests as well. For all remaining practices, this
section compares the results of making commonness the primary proxy
for the monopolization test with the results of current tests, which
employ legitimate business justifications and efficiencies as the exclusive
proxy. The comparison is performed on the basis of an error cost frame-
work, because, as explained in Part III.A, monopolization tests are essen-
tially tests that attempt to minimize the error cost in estimating but never
accurately observing the real welfare effects of business practices.
Stripped of all definitional issues and fine-tuning requirements, to
make commonness the primary proxy of normal competition is to specify
that that which is common and not designed to harm competition ought
to be normal competition. This contrasts with the current belief that
whatever is efficient ought to be normal competition and not monopolis-
tic. This is an impermissible conclusion, because according to the classic
is/ought fallacy one cannot directly derive an ought statement from an is
statement.168 Is statements are factual—they describe empirical truths
such as a practice is common in the market.169 Ought statements are
evaluative—they reflect an opinion that relies on and presupposes a sys-
tem of values such as a practice ought to be accepted as normal competi-
tion.170 The is/ought fallacy tells us that we cannot directly derive that
practice A ought to be normal competition from the statement that prac-
tice A is common, absent a system of values that takes the form of a uni-
versal ought principle such as practices that are common ought to be
accepted as normal competition.171
168This is originally attributed to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (e-Book last
updated Nov. 10, 2012). See also John R. Searle, How to Derive “Ought” from “Is,” in THE IS/
OUGHT QUESTION 120 (Donald Hudson ed., 1969).
169Alan Gewirth, The “Is-Ought” Problem Resolved, 47 PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE AMER-
ICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 34 (1973).
170Id.; Donald Hudson, The “Is-Ought” Problem, in THE IS/OUGHT QUESTION 11 (Donald Hud-
son ed., 1969).
171Hudson, supra note 170.
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The complete syllogism now looks like this: (1) practices that are com-
mon and not designed to harm competition ought to be accepted as nor-
mal competition (universal ought principle); (2) practice A is common
and not designed to harm competition (is statement); and (3) practice
A ought to be accepted as normal competition (particular ought
judgment).
Existing tests also necessitate and do indeed come with their own uni-
versal ought principle in the form of practices that are supported by
legitimate business justifications, or efficiencies ought to be accepted as
normal competition. Since under conditions of uncertainty error is inevi-
table, to give precedence to commonness over competition on the merits
as the universal ought principle,172 we do not need to establish that the
commonness test yields perfect results—only that it yields better results
than existing tests by helping reduce false positive and false negative
errors.
In comparing the commonness test with existing competition on the
merits tests, there are three possibilities (see Figure 2). The first is that a
practice passes both the commonness test and existing tests—it is both
common and exhibits business justifications and efficiencies. In that case
FIGURE 2. Interface of Existing and Commonness Tests.
172Doing so would justify the universal evaluative statement, a necessary condition to derive
an evaluative statement from other evaluative statements. See Gewirth, supra note 169.
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the two tests deliver similar results, so neither is superior.173 The second
possibility is one in which a practice that under conditions of perfect
information is welfare enhancing, would pass the commonness test, but
would fail existing competition on the merits tests. This situation could
arise due to the false positive susceptibility of competition on the merits
tests identified in Part II.B. In this case the commonness test would
deliver good results, but existing tests would deliver false positive results.
They would wrongly indicate that a practice is welfare reducing when it
is not, and therefore the commonness test should be preferred.
The third possibility is one by which a practice that under conditions
of perfect information is welfare reducing, would pass the commonness
test, but would fail existing competition on the merits tests. This is a sce-
nario whereby the commonness test would deliver false negative results
and would wrongly indicate that a practice is welfare enhancing when it
is not. In these cases existing tests would deliver good results, and there-
fore the commonness test should not be preferred.
Under this setup of the commonness test and existing competition on
the merits tests as error tests, the decision whether one should keep the
commonness test depends on whether, based on the latter two possibili-
ties, it is more welfare enhancing to tolerate the errors of the common-
ness test or those of existing tests.
As should be obvious from the exposition above, the commonness test
is less susceptible to false positive errors than existing tests, since the
commonness test never filters out procompetitive conduct.174 To the con-
trary, the commonness test is more susceptible to false negative errors,
because of the higher standard competition on the merits tests employ
compared to commonness. It is generally believed by Chicago School
proponents that it is better to tolerate false negatives than false positives,
because the wrongful condemnation of procompetitive conduct results in
a permanent loss of the conduct’s benefit, whereas the wrongful permis-
sion of anticompetitive conduct will be short-lived as markets are
173If we could have perfect information on the actual (rather than the estimated) effects of
the challenged practice, we may discover that both tests were right to allow the challenged
practice or that both tests were wrong. In any case, since both delivered similar results, this
possibility is inconclusive.
174The only way for procompetitive conduct to fail the commonness test is to not be com-
mon, in which case the commonness test reverts to existing tests.
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believed to be self-correcting.175 The commonness test would accord-
ingly benefit from such argumentation.
This line of thinking has proven remarkably resilient,176 but upon
closer inspection the general principle that false negatives are always to
be preferred over false positives is too coarse. Instead, more nuanced
criteria should be considered—specifically, the impact and frequency of
each type of error.177 Everything else equal, if one of the two types of
errors results in greater negative impact on welfare, then the test that is
more susceptible to this error type should be disfavored. And, again
everything else equal, if one of the two error types is more likely to
occur, then the test that is more susceptible to this error type should be
disfavored.
A confluence of factors determines the severity of negative impact,
including the actual social welfare cost, the mitigating effects of any
available corrective or second-best mechanisms to limit the harm, and
the durability of the error until it dissipates from the market (see
Table 1).
The social cost of false positives is generally seen as high. Once a prac-
tice is deemed to be anticompetitive, its benefits are lost, not just for the
introducing firm, but for any other firm that was considering engaging
in the practice.178 This is a significant cost, because it negates the benefits
of static and dynamic efficiency across the market as far as the banned
practice is concerned. But to that we should add the broader and surrep-
titious cost of hostile signaling to the market—without justifications and
175Easterbrook, supra note 114; Evans & Padilla, supra note 22.
176Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition for and in the Field of
Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401 (2003).
177Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75 (2010); Salop,
supra note 22.
178Easterbrook, supra note 114; Evans & Padilla, supra note 22.
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efficiencies, the challenged practice may not survive.179 This has an addi-
tional chilling effect, as the stricter the standard antitrust laws adopt, the
greater the deterrent effect regardless of its intensity in absolute
terms.180 Because of their susceptibility to false positive errors, existing
competition on the merits tests result in overdeterrence compared to the
commonness test, which increases the social cost.
The commonness test on the other hand, suffers from the opposite
weakness—susceptibility to welfare-reducing practices, the cost of which
can be high.181 However, the social cost of false negative errors of the
commonness test is discounted by one important factor. Presumably, anti-
competitive practices are not purely harmful—they also generate benefits
for the introducing firms. Otherwise, they would not be adopted. As a
result, the negative externalities of anticompetitive practices are partly
offset by the internalized benefits to the firms that engage in the practice,
whereas in the case of false positive errors of existing tests, there is no
benefit to anyone, as the benefits of procompetitive practices are lost erga
omnes.
In fact, some of the benefits accrued to the firm can then be rolled
over to consumers. Examples include additional research and develop-
ment or savings from economies of scale, either because the offending
firm is “benevolent”182 or as part of the firm’s effort to escape potential
future enforcement action against it. The point here is not to condone
anticompetitive practices, but to say that for every permitted anticompet-
itive practice, there is some benefit and therefore an overall lower social
179See Jonathan Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27 (2003). This
follows from the general observation that the way a rule is designed affects the behavior of
the subjects of the rule. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (2009).
180On the varying degrees of the deterrent effect of antitrust law, see Fiammetta Gordon &
David Squires, The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement, 156 DE ECONOMIST 411–32
(2008); Kai Hu¨schelrath, Nina Leheyda & Patrick Beschorner, The Deterrent Effect of Anti-
trust Sanctions: Evidence from Switzerland, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 427 (2011). But see John
S. Thompson & David L. Kaserman, After the Fall: Stock Price Movements and the Deterrent
Effect of Antitrust Enforcement, 19 REV. INDUS. ORG. 329 (2001).
181Salop, countering Easterbrook, is concerned that “when there are high entry barriers, a
destroyed entrant likely cannot be resurrected or replaced.” Salop, supra note 22, at 350.
182See, e.g., Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018), wherein American Express
claimed that increased merchant’s fees are passed on to consumers in the form of loyalty
benefits.
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cost compared to banned procompetitive practices that do not benefit
anyone.
Moreover, in the case of permitted anticompetitive practices there are
mitigating mechanisms to limit the extent of the harm, whereas in the case
of banned procompetitive practices, all of their value is lost. This is because
they cease to exist altogether, and their benefit is impossible to recover
unless firms nevertheless engage in them and thereby risk enforcement
action.183 Devlin and Jacobs counterargue that second-best practices that
carry some of the procompetitive value of the banned practice but none of
the anticompetitive elements may partly contain the loss.184 While plausi-
ble, this argument expresses more of a hope than a reliable solution, as it is
unknown how closely second-best practices will match the procompetitive
value of the original banned practice. Moreover, because second-best prac-
tices could have arisen, even in the presence of the original banned prac-
tice, the latter remains as the net loss in both cases.185
On the other hand, the impact of common anticompetitive practices of
the sort that could be permissible by the commonness test should be miti-
gated through what is generally considered the most appropriate
mechanism—regulation. While antitrust law is appropriate for surgical
intervention to rectify isolated anticompetitive conduct, ex ante
rulemaking is superior when dealing with issues of potentially broad
application or effects.186 A number of reasons support that conclusion,
including fairness, legal certainty, and the prescriptive nature of
rulemaking when the problem is established or foreseeable.187 I am not
making a general comment on the superiority of regulation, and in fact I
am sympathetic to concerns about the cumbersome aspects of regulation,
especially in fast-paced environments.188 However, I am using regulation
183Easterbrook, supra note 114, at 15.
184Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 177.
185See Manne & Wright, supra note 113, at 182.
186Richard K. Berg, Re-Examining Policy Procedures: The Choice Between Rulemaking and Adju-
dication, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 149 (1986); David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudi-
cation in the Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
187See Warren E. Baker, Policy by Rule or “Ad Hoc” Approach. Which Should It Be?, 22 L. & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 658 (1957).
188This concern is older than commonly assumed. See Bernie Burrus & Harry Teter, Anti-
trust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 GEO. L.J. 1106 (1966).
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in the broadest sense to encompass any method of proscribing conduct,
which can range from traditional command and control regulation to
light and flexible regulatory methods such as nudging189 and “raised
eyebrow” regulation.190 Therefore, introducing regulation as a comple-
mentary mechanism to antitrust enforcement191 can be an appropriate
response when dealing with repeat offenses without this necessarily
involving the traditional woes of heavy-handed regulation. A good exam-
ple is the expansion of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC)
regulatory powers over interconnection disputes on the Internet—
previously handled as a private or antitrust matter—when the FCC
noticed the increasing frequency and severity of the disputes.192 Interest-
ingly, the FCC did not exercise its full regulatory arsenal in interconnec-
tion disputes, but rather relied only on the “light touch” regulatory
backstop of a flexible rule that prohibits common carriers from engaging
in “unjust and unreasonable” practices.193
The third determinant concerns the durability of errors. Easterbrook
submits that the results of the error of banning procompetitive practices
are permanent, because the act of banning means that the challenged
practice has been given due consideration and has been found illegal.
This characterization is bound to persist until and unless the case law is
reversed—an uncommon occurrence.194 Others rightfully contest the
total irreversibility of judicial errors, claiming that courts can and do
depart from prior case law.195 But it is fair to say that abandoning prior
189Robert Baldwin, From Regulation to Behaviour Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree,
77 MODERN L. REV. 831 (2014).
190In the words of Clay Whitehead, former President Richard Nixon’s Head of the Office
of Telecommunications Policy, “[t]he value of the sword of Damocles is that it hangs, not
falls.” See KIMBERLY ZARKIN & MICHAEL ZARKIN, THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION:
FRONT LINE IN THE CULTURE AND REGULATION WARS (2006) (quoting Whitehead).
191STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
192FCC, In re: Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on
Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561(7), ¶¶ 199–202 (Mar.
12, 2015).
193Id. ¶ 203.
194Easterbrook, supra note 114, at 15. See also Oona Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001).
195Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 177; Salop, supra note 22.
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case law that deems conduct anticompetitive is arguably harder than
starting to prosecute conduct that was thought to be innocuous. In the
latter case there is no prior binding practice. Most importantly, even
when the commonness test fails to ban an anticompetitive practice
because it is found to be common and not designed to harm competition,
there is a self-correcting mechanism. As our understanding of a common
practice improves, and evidence of its anticompetitive effects increases, it
becomes harder for the challenged firm to claim that the practice was
not designed to harm competition, which would cause it to fail the com-
monness test. Therefore, the possibility that the commonness test will
allow anticompetitive practices in the long run is low.
The preceding analysis on the gravity of error cost makes a reason-
able case for the commonness test in terms of its expected error cost
compared to existing competition on the merits tests. The last factor is
frequency of errors. Everything else equal, if a test is more likely to
result in errors, it should be disfavored compared to other tests. It is
common knowledge that existing competition on the merits tests comes
with an extensive record of wrongfully banning welfare-enhancing
practices (false negatives are far less common), and therefore they
exhibit frequent errors.196 So widespread has been the suspiciousness
of antitrust law against seemingly anticompetitive—though in reality
neutral or procompetitive—business practices, that at its height it
earned the “inhospitality tradition” stigma.197 The number of practices
that used to be considered per se illegal but gradually moved toward
an effects-based approach is a testament to all the potential false posi-
tive errors committed throughout this time.198 The preservation of the
per se label for some practices (especially in the European Union),
despite evidence of potentially procompetitive justifications, suggests
further errors.
Since the commonness test has not yet been implemented, there is
admittedly little room for meaningful comparison regarding frequency.
But at least one available study is reassuring that the application of the
196See, e.g., Manne & Wright, supra note 113, at 172–83 (documenting antitrust cases that
involved technological innovations).
197Easterbrook, supra note 114, at 4.
198William Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking,
14 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (2000).
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commonness test may result in fewer errors. In an ex post study of
whether thirteen landmark cases were decided correctly by courts apply-
ing current tests, Nalebuff and Majerus found a thirty percent error
rate.199 Of the wrongly decided cases, three involve facts that suggest
that the practices under question were common, including tying house-
hold tools to supplies, bundling holiday package services, and bundling
phone and broadband service.200 This means that, assuming they were
not designed to harm competition, an application of the commonness
test would have allowed them, as they should have been according to the
authors of the study.
In summary, preliminary evidence suggests that incorporating com-
monness into the heuristic of normal competition will enhance antitrust
analysis. In the end, even if the commonness test remains unused, it at
least stands as a reminder that antitrust law should factor in how busi-
nesses commonly conduct themselves in the market.
CONCLUSION
A number of observations and arguments were made in this article. First,
the article revealed the absolute dominance of business justifications and
efficiencies as proxies to distinguish between normal and anticompetitive
practices. Second, it provided the first systematic explanation as to why
the universality of business justifications and efficiencies is problematic—
it detaches antitrust law from the reality of the very subjects it purports
to regulate. Third, it introduced commonness of a business practice as a
new parameter to identify normal competition. Lastly, it developed an
error cost framework to prove that the commonness parameter can
enhance the process of identifying which practices should be considered
normal competition.
Taken together, these contributions are important for multiple reasons.
The obsession of antitrust law with business justifications and efficiencies
has remained unobserved and the associated problems underestimated.
199Barry Nalebuff & David Majerus, Bundling, Tying, and Portfolio Effects (Part 2), DTI ECO-
NOMICS PAPER (2003), https://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/ARCHIVES/GENERAL/UK_DTI/
T030207N.pdf.
200Id. The three cases involve Hilti Aktiengesellshaft, United Kingdom foreign package hol-
idays and insurance, and British Telecom telephone and internet bundling.
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Antitrust law has been successful in incorporating lessons from industrial
economics, the field that studies how firms interact with each other in
the market, but less so from managerial economics, the field that studies
how firms behave. This article serves as a reminder that the modus
operandi of firms should not be ignored—otherwise, antitrust law risks
becoming irrelevant. More substantially though, this article puts forth a
specific proposal for how this can be achieved and provides a transparent
comparative assessment of the proposal. In effect, this article becomes
the first one to challenge the universal adoption of competition on the
merits and to propose a workable alternative solution.
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